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1 Measures implemented to address the COVID-19 crisis: From constitutional emergency 
to administrative exception 
1.1 Measures before the state of exception
Before the declaration of constitutional emergency, and to prevent the national health system from collaps-
ing, the Portuguese Government enforced several measures under the existent legislative order (addressed 
in further detail at 2). Based on the Framework Law of Civil Protection and the order Health Law, on March 
12th, the Government enacted Decree-Law 10-A/2020, which approved the closure of schools, permitted 
future restrictions on accessing shopping malls, restaurants and bars, established teleworking as mandatory, 
and allowed a prompt public procurement regime for public health services.
Reinforcing these measures, the Government issued several administrative orders: on March 15th, it limited 
access to shopping malls, restaurants and bars1 and suspended the activity of dental practices;2 on March 
16th, it reintroduced border control, exceptionally and for a limited timeframe;3 on March 17th, it ordered the 
civil requisition of port workers, which limited their right to strike;4 and on March 18th, it moved further to 
suspending air-traffic with non-EU countries.5
1.2 Constitutional emergency
1.2.1 Constitutional emergency design in the Portuguese Constitution
States of exception are constitutional self-protective mechanisms aimed at restoring constitutional normality. 
Having absorbed harsh constitutional history lessons, modern European constitutional texts enshrine several 
obstacles to the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights (Botelho, 2020a). In Portugal, in the same 
way the Constitution consecrates its amendment rules, it also establishes the substantial and procedural rules 
of constitutional exception. The domestication of exception therefore joins the domestication of amendment 
rules (Botelho, 2020a; Ribeiro, 2020). The rules on constitutional exception are dispersed throughout the 
constitutional text (Articles 19, 138, 172, 275, § 7, 289, amongst others). As it is impossible to anticipate all 
scenarios of constitutional exception, Law no 44/86 regulates the state of exception.6
Constitutional exception is divided into ‘state of siege’ and ‘state of emergency’. While the state of siege is de-
signed for situations of insurrection with physical aggression, the state of emergency is less severe. Portugal has 
opted for a refined constitutional design: the constitution limits the rights that can be suspended, as well as impos-
es a time limit and the obligation to respect proportionality. During constitutional exception, Parliament cannot 
be dissolved (Article 172) and constitutional amendments are prohibited (Article 289), as well as referenda.
The declaration of emergency and the concomitant suspension of fundamental rights is not a blank check 
(Botelho, 2020a). Unlike the German Basic law, which does not establish which rights can be suspended,7 or 
the Spanish and Brazilian constitutions that specify which rights can be suspended, 8 the Portuguese Consti-
1. Administrative Rule no. 71/2020, of March 15th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 52-A. 
2. Administrative Order no. 3301-A/2020, of March 15th, Diário da República, 2nd Series, no. 52-B.
3. Resolution no. 10-B/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of March 16th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 53. 
4. Resolution no. 10-C/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of March 17th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 54.
5. Administrative Order no. 3427-A/2020, of March 18th, Diário da República, 2nd Series, no. 55. With the relevant exceptions 
of the Schengen area, Portuguese-speaking countries, and countries with significant diaspora (United Kingdom, United States of 
America, Venezuela, Canada, and South Africa). 
6. Law no. 44/1986, of September 30th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 225.
7. Articles 115-A and ff. of the Grundgesetz. 
8. Article 136, § 1 of the Brazilian Constitution and Articles 17, 18, § 2 e 3, 19, 20, § 1, a) and § 5, 21, 28, § 2, and 37, § 2 of the 
Spanish Constitution. 
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tution has adopted a negative design: the constitution expressly mentions which rights cannot be suspended 
(Botelho, 2020b: 61–65).
As stated in Article 19, § 6, of the Constitution, the rights to life, personal integrity, personal identity, civil 
capacity and citizenship, the non-retroactivity of criminal law, and freedom of religion can never be suspended, 
in any situation. Furthermore, in a state of emergency, rights susceptible to suspension (all others that are not 
constitutionally protected) can only be partially suspended. 
At the same time, to avoid a unilateral suspension of rights, the Constitution provides a mechanism of mutual 
control. Hence, the state of emergency is agreed between the three main political institutions: The President, 
the Government, and Parliament. Checks and balances are enforced by the following formula: The President 
declares, Parliament authorizes, and the Government executes the state of emergency. It is thus a case of 
presidential prominence mitigated by the interdependence of the Parliament and the Government (Botelho, 
2020b: 68–71).
1.2.2 Three presidential decrees of emergency and their execution by the Government
On 18th March 2020, just two weeks after the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Portugal, the President of 
the Republic declared the state of emergency. This was the first declaration of emergency since the transition to 
democracy, forty-six years before. The presidential decree enacted the partial suspension of certain fundamen-
tal rights, such as cross-border circulation, the right to strike, and the rights of assembly and demonstration.9 
Subsequent to the presidential declaration, the Government approved a decree that placed different groups of 
citizens under the duties of compulsory confinement, special protection and sheltering at home.10 Moreover, 
the decision to grant migrants and asylum-seekers with pending applications the rights to healthcare, housing 
and social support until June 30th was internationally praised. 
As the declaration of emergency is constitutionally limited to fifteen days,11 on April 2nd the President decided 
to renew the state of emergency,12 maintaining that the emergency declaration proved to be the wisest choice, 
as it was able to flatten the coronavirus curve. In addition to extending the previous declaration of emergency, 
the President also authorized the suspension of the freedom to learn and teach, and the right to data protection, 
and reinforced the restrictions on freedom of movement during the Easter period. From my perspective, if 
the presidential declaration was mainly preventive with regards to the first period of the state of emergency, 
its renewal was clearly reactive. 
On April 17th, the President renewed the state of emergency for the second and last time (until the 2nd May), 
justifying the extension with the need to give the Government time to define criteria for a trustful reopening 
of society and the economy.13 Probably, the political powers took into consideration the incertitude of the 
state of emergency’s deadline, which could trigger societal anxiety and result in an insurmountable impact 
on the economy.
The terms of the new extension of the declaration of emergency were quite similar to the previous one. How-
ever, this decree enabled the possibility of reactivating services, businesses, and establishments in a “gradual, 
phased, alternate and differentiated manner”. Furthermore, the decree reconsidered the application of the 
restrictions on the right to travel.14 
9. Presidential Decree no. 14-A/2020, of March 18th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 55. 
10. Decree-Law no. 2-A/2020, of March 20th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 57. 
11. Article 19, § 5, of the Portuguese Constitution. 
12. Presidential Decree no. 17-A/2020, of April 2nd, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 66. See also Decree-Law no. 2-B/2020, of 
April 2nd, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 66, which regulates the first extension of the constitutional emergency. 
13. Presidential Decree no. 20-A/2020, of April 17th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 76. 
14. Decree-Law no. 2-C/2020, of April 17th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 76, which regulates the second and last extension 
of the constitutional emergency.
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1.3 Administrative escalator of exception: states of alert, contingency and calamity
On May 3rd, the Council of Ministers declared a national state of calamity for a period of fifteen days, allowing 
a slow economic reopening and the relaxation of some of the previous restrictions.15 As the President and the 
Government were unwilling to extend the state of emergency, therefore avoiding its trivialization, Portugal 
transitioned to an administrative state of calamity. In other words, Portugal adjusted to constitutional nor-
mality, while maintaining a degree of administrative exception through the administrative state of calamity. 
In short and according to the Civil Protection Framework Law, the administrative escalator of exception con-
sists of three degrees of restrictiveness of measures taken by the Government. The state of alert is the least 
restrictive state (Articles 13 to 15), while the state of contingency is an intermediate state (Articles 16 to 18) 
and the state of calamity the most limiting of the three (Articles 19 to 31).
Under the state of calamity, the main measures taken were the following: sheltering at home was downgraded 
from a legal obligation to a non-compulsory civic duty; teleworking was encouraged; exercise and outdoor 
activities were allowed; local shops could open; public services reopened; and funerals with the presence of 
all family members were allowed. Border control remained in place.
On May 17th, the state of calamity was renewed, with less strict measures.16 For example, visits to elderly in 
care homes, and museums, monuments, and cultural spaces were allowed. Also, an exceptional and temporary 
regime was established regarding the use of beaches. On May 29th, the state of calamity was renewed once 
again, until June 14th, and special measures were introduced for the Lisbon metropolitan area (which was, 
by then, more greatly affected by new COVID-19 cases), such as limiting gatherings to a maximum of 10 
persons, and no consumption of alcohol in public spaces.17
On July 14th, the Government declared all three possibilities of administrative exception, according to the 
severity of the pandemic situation18. With this in mind and until July 31st, the following was stated: a state 
of alert for the entire country (except the Lisbon metropolitan area); a state of contingency in the majority 
of the Lisbon metropolitan area; and a state of calamity in 19 parishes of the Lisbon metropolitan area.19 As 
mentioned, the state of alert is the least severe, with measures such as mandatory confinement for patients 
and persons under active surveillance, and gatherings limited to 20 people. In the middle, the state of contin-
gency added the measures of closing most commercial establishments at 8 p.m. and reducing gatherings to 
10 people. The most severe state of calamity, in addition to the previous measures, restricted gatherings to 5 
people, and fairs and markets were prohibited. On July 15th, a Decree-Law was approved that imposed new 
air traffic rules for Portugal, with fines of up to €3,000.20
On July 17th, the Government granted a 1,200 million euro rescue loan to the Portuguese national airline TAP 
to tackle its liquidity requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic21 and, on July 30th, approved support for 
distressed companies with a severe downturn in revenue.22 
15. Resolution no. 33-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of April 30th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 85.
16. Resolution no. 38-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of May 17th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 95-B.
17. Resolution no. 40-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of May 29th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 105.
18. Resolution no. 53-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of July 14th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 135.
19. In all parishes of Amadora and Odivelas, and in some of Sintra, Loures and Lisbon. 
20. Decree-Law no. 37-A/2020, of July 15th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 136. 
21. Resolution no. 53-C/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of July 17th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 138. 
22. Decree-Law no. 46-A/2020, of July 30th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 147.
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On July 31st, the Government maintained the state of alert for the entire country while the state of contingen-
cy was extended to the entire Lisbon metropolitan area.23 On August 14th, this scenario was prolonged until 
August 31st.24 
On August 14th, the Government approved the “StayAway COVID” app, an application for mobile phones 
that allows swift and anonymous tracking of the spread of contagion by COVID-19.25 Download is volun-
tary, but there was some degree of governmental pressure for COVID-19 positive individuals to install it as 
a “civic duty”. Pertinently, the Portuguese Data Protection Commission raised some privacy concerns about 
“StayAway COVID”, given the use of the Google and Apple interface.26 On August 20th, the Government 
authorized the investment of 20 million euros in contracts to acquire vaccines against COVID-19 under the 
centralized European procedure.27 
On August 28th, the Government renewed the state of alert for the entire country, with the exception of the 
Lisbon metropolitan area, which remained in a state of contingency.28 After a meeting of the Council of Min-
isters, on September 10th, the Government announced that, from September 15th onwards, and as a result of 
the reopening of schools, it would declare a state of contingency for the entire continental territory.29 Overall, 
it would impose additional restrictive measures to avoid concentrations of people, in particular near schools, 
restaurants, and shopping areas. 
2 COVID-19 regulation in Portugal
Emergency law is not exclusive to the constitutional framework. Rather, the ordinary legal arena also regulates 
emergency in the form of the Civil Protection Framework Law, the Health Framework Law, and the Law on 
Public Vigilance of Health Risks. Even a cursory glance at the Portuguese legislation reveals the presence of 
an ordinary emergency law. The Civil Protection Framework Law permits some restrictions on fundamental 
rights, such as limiting the circulation of persons and vehicles, and temporary requisition of products and 
services. The Health Framework Law, in turn, allocates powers to health authorities to address public health 
hazards, including requisition of health facilities and professionals, determination of confinement of individ-
uals, and decisions on closing public and private facilities. Finally, the Law on Public Vigilance of Health 
Risks addresses public health emergencies and allows the suspension of activities.
COVID-19 regulation prior to, during, and after the state of emergency is immense.30 A non-exhaustive list 
of legislation is available in 5. a). 
3 Legislation-making and enforcement 
3.1 A sui generis system of government 
After several decades of parliamentary instability (during the First Republic, 1910–1926) and dictatorship 
(1926–1933 and 1933–1974), the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 sought to establish a system of government 
that would emphasize checks and balances between the main political organs: The President, the Govern-
23. Resolution no. 55-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of July 31st, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 148.
24. Resolution no. 63-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of August 14th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 148.
25. Decree-Law no. 52/2020, of August 11th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 155. 
26. Deliberation no. 2020/277, of June 29th, available at: https://www.cnpd.pt/home/decisoes/Delib/DEL_2020_277.pdf 
27. Resolution no. 64-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of August 20th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 162. 
28. Resolution no. 68-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of August 28th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 168.
29. Resolution no. 70-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of September 11th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 178.
30. See the very useful link: https://dre.pt/legislacao-covid-19-upo 
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ment and Parliament. The Portuguese political system is mostly characterized as semi-presidential, since the 
President of the Republic is directly elected, and both the Government and Prime Minister are politically 
responsible to the legislature.
The Portuguese system was influenced by French semi-presidentialism, and the rationalized parliamentarism 
of the Weimar Republic. Yet, the Portuguese Constitution reveals some unique traits. In continuity with the 
previous Constitution of 1933, the current Constitution grants the Government a wide range of legislative 
powers: (i) exclusive powers “to legislate on matters that concern its own organization and modus operandi” 
(Article 198, § 2); (ii) independent powers to legislate “on matters that do not fall within the exclusive com-
petence of the Assembly of the Republic” (Article 198, § 1, a)), and therefore law (parliament’s legislation) 
and decree-law (government’s legislation) share the exact same legal status; (iii) and dependent powers to 
legislate on matters of the competence of Parliament (Article 165), “subject to authorization” (Article 198, 
§ 1, b)), and to “make executive laws that develop the principles or the general bases of the legal regimes 
contained in laws that limit themselves to those principles or general bases” (Article 198, § 1, c)).
In Europe, parliaments are decreasing their political and legislative strength in favour of governments, which 
possess indirect democratic legitimacy. The extent of the Portuguese government’s independent/concurring 
powers is unique in a comparative constitutional law perspective. Although the parliament is the most im-
portant legislative organ—since qualitatively the most relevant subjects belong to its area of legislative 
competence (Articles 161, 164 and 165) and it has primacy even above governmental legislation (Article 
169)31—quantitatively, the government legislates much more. In fact, the government produces 80% of the 
legislation.
The strengthening of governmental powers during constitutional exception is justified by the fact that executive 
powers are able to respond immediately to exceptional societal struggles, whereas judicial power is passive 
and legislative power depends on the amount of time required for proper reflection and deliberation (Ribeiro, 
2020). The current national state of administrative exception, regulated in infra-constitutional legislation, 
does not entail checks and balances from the President and Parliament. The question, then, is the following: 
Has the transition from a constitutional state of emergency to an administrative state of exception increased 
the powers allocated to the Portuguese Government? 
The answer, though, is not straightforward. If, on the one hand, the exercise of fundamental rights is not 
partially suspended (as such a suspension can only happen through the trio of the Presidential declaration of 
emergency, Parliamentary approval, and Governmental countersignature and execution), on the other hand, 
the Civil Protection Framework Law allows limitations to the circulation of persons and vehicles, access to 
private property, and temporary requisition of products and services. Besides, fundamental rights can still be 
restricted, within the requirements of Article 18 of the Constitution. 
To counterbalance a possible excess of the Government’s legislative powers, the President plays a relevant role. 
Unlike the veto of parliament legislation, which can be overcome,32 the veto of government legislation is defin-
itive (Article 136, § 4).33 Therefore, the Portuguese President is more than a mere “pouvoir neutre” (Benjamin 
Constant) who preserves national stability, guarantees checks and balances between the organs of the state, and 
guards the Constitution of 1976. In short, the President can willingly play a more interventive political role.
31. According to Article 169, no 1: “1. Save for those passed in the exercise of the Government’s exclusive legislative competence, 
executive laws may, upon a motion made by ten Members of the Assembly of the Republic within the thirty days following their 
publication (…) be subjected to consideration by the Assembly of the Republic with a view to causing them to cease to be in force 
or amending them.” 
32. According to Article 136, § 2: “If the Assembly of the Republic confirms its vote by an absolute majority of all the Members of 
the Assembly of the Republic in full exercise of their office, the President of the Republic must enact the legislative act within a time 
limit of eight days counting from its receipt”.
33. Although a government with a parliamentary majority can always overcome the presidential veto, through Article 197, § 1, 
d): “In the exercise of its political functions the Government has the competences to present and submit government bills and 
draft resolutions to the Assembly of the Republic”. Then, the government can “copy-paste” its law-decree onto a draft resolution 
for Parliament. If Parliament approves the draft and the subsequent law, the President can veto that law, but Parliament is able to 
overcome the veto by an absolute majority (Article 136, § 2). 
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It seems undeniable that current President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa is a dynamic and omnipresent President. 
Notwithstanding being very (pro)active, the President has scarcely exercised his veto power and his power to 
initiate constitutional review of legislation. There are some exceptions, though. In August, President Marcelo 
Rebelo de Sousa vetoed two diplomas related to changes in parliamentary activities: (i) the reduction of par-
liamentary debates on Europe with the Prime Minister; (ii) and the raise in the number of signatures required 
for citizens’ petitions to be debated in the plenary of Parliament (from 4,000 to 10,000). The President consid-
ered that these changes would be detrimental to public perception of national involvement with the European 
Union, to the vitality of democracy and to the encouragement of citizens’ participation. 
3.2 Political and administrative decentralization
To assure the universal right to health, Portugal implemented a national health system, overseen by the Minister 
of Health (and its Directorate-General of Health). Several reforms took place aimed at decentralizing primary 
health care to address health needs at local, regional, and national levels. Nevertheless, despite administrative 
decentralization and reforms, health services are still overly centralized (Lomba, 2020a: 40–41). 
According to Article 6 of the Constitution, Portugal is a partial and homogeneous regional unitary state. In fact, 
there is one single Kompetenz-Kompetenz power, but with two autonomous regions with limited legislative, 
executive and international powers. Along with continental Portugal, they form the whole of the Portuguese 
Republic. Contrary to other constitutional experiences (such as Spain), autonomy is not a right per se, but a 
“constitutional status”. It is the Constitution that defines the regions—in the Portuguese case, the archipelagos 
of Azores and Madeira—and the extent of their competences.  
Notably, measures to address the pandemic were stricter in Madeira and in the Azores than in continental 
Portugal. In Madeira, the state of calamity was extended until September 30th, and the use of protective masks 
in all public spaces (indoors and outdoors) was imposed. In the remaining Portuguese territory, social distanc-
ing measures included mandatory use of protective masks in closed public spaces, for persons over 10 years 
old. In the Azores (and as I will report in 4.3.) there were several requests of habeas corpus on compulsory 
confinement, which resulted in a judgment of unconstitutionality by the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
(Freitas, 2020: 77). 
4 Academic debate on fundamental rights’ distress in Portugal 
4.1 Debate on the measures approved before the state of exception
As the constitutional emergency legislation was adopted in a haste to address the crisis, there are some 
constitutional issues worth mentioning. In the Portuguese Constitution, the fundamental rights that are not 
specifically safeguarded in Article 19, § 6 can be suspended during constitutional emergencies. Apart from 
the emergency scenario, fundamental rights can be restricted as long as the six cumulative requirements of 
Article 18 are fulfilled (one of the requirements, as well as proportionality, is that the restriction is legislated 
by Parliament or by the Government with prior authorization by Parliament).34 
Despite having legislated mostly within the existing legislative framework, in Decree-Law 10-A/2020, of 
March 12th, the Government approved restrictive measures before the declaration of a constitutional emer-
gency, which raised doctrinal critique. As a result, it endorsed measures not contemplated in the emergency 
legislation previously passed by Parliament. What is more intriguing is that such restrictions were ratified a 
posteriori by Parliament,35 in what “resembles an indemnity bill” (Violante & Lanceiro, 2020), and in vio-
lation of the prohibition of retroactive restrictions granted by Article 18, § 3 of the Portuguese Constitution. 
34. For a distinction between restriction and suspension of fundamental rights, see Botelho (2020b: 57–59).  
35. Law no. 1-A/2020, of March 19th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 56.
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4.2 Debate on the pertinence and on the design of the constitutional emergency
The question that follows can be stated thus: Was the declaration of constitutional emergency adequate or 
was it impulsive and overzealous? Maybe only time will tell the rightness of the constitutional and adminis-
trative measures of the last months. Still, from my perspective, the declaration of emergency was at that time 
inevitable and necessary to contain the spread of the virus and to overcome constitutional issues that would 
derive from implementing a wider range of restrictive measures (Botelho, 2020a).
More importantly, back then, constitutional law scholars strongly disagreed as to whether the existing emer-
gency legislation allowed the imposition of quarantine and confinement without prior judicial order. Some 
argued that quarantine could be imposed based on an extensive reading of Article 64 of the Constitution (right 
to health) (Guedes, 2020). Yet, others claimed that h), § 3 of Article 27 expressly rejected such a possibility, 
as it restricts the deprivation of freedom to situations in which a judicial authority orders the “committal of 
a person suffering from a psychic anomaly to an appropriate therapeutic establishment”. Therefore, and ac-
cording to this last doctrinal stance, a constitutional amendment would be required to allow the imposition 
of quarantine due to infectious diseases (Novais, 2020a: 93–101).
Presidential decrees of emergency provide the normative framework under which the Government may 
intervene. Still, such decrees were too general in this case and did not sufficiently determine the conditions 
under which the Government could restrict some rights and freedoms (Botelho, 2020b: 75–76; Lomba, 2020b; 
Silva, 2020; Terrinha, 2020: 15–16). Moreover, they did not specify which articles of the Constitution were 
suspended, as required in Article 19, § 5. Consequently, Portuguese scholarship is at present debating the 
constitutional design of presidential decrees of emergency. Notwithstanding some critiques, it should be 
remembered that this was the first time since the transition to democracy that a constitutional emergency has 
been declared. Under these circumstances, and given that the President could not take inspiration from past 
drafts of constitutional emergency decrees, he had to actively engage with the constitution “in action” and 
explore unknown terrain (Botelho, 2020b: 76).
Be that as it may, it is relevant to stress that the decision to declare a constitutional emergency should not 
be left to the discretion of the President, Parliament, and Government triad. On the contrary, constitutional 
emergency can turn out to be a constitutional obligation when it becomes crucial to defend (and, in some 
situations, even save) the constitutional order.
4.3 Debate on the transition from constitutional emergency to administrative exception: a de facto 
constitutional emergency?  
The normative framework of the administrative states of alarm, contingency and calamity is limited when 
compared with the normative framework of the constitutional state of emergency. Consistent with these 
general understandings, the Portuguese Government could not maintain the legal duty of sheltering at 
home and had to adjust it to a civil duty of sheltering at home. Either way, legal scholarship has argued for 
possible unconstitutionalities in the COVID-19 legislation when imposing a state of calamity, such as the 
prohibition on more than ten people meeting (or participating in events and celebrations) in public places 
(Medeiros, 2020).
The administrative state of calamity can never become a de facto constitutional state of emergency or a 
“soft state of emergency” (Moreira, 2020). To surreptitiously extend the state of emergency under a dif-
ferent name—state of calamity—while imposing mainly the same restrictive measures would represent a 
constitutional “fraud” (Castro, 2020). To protect the rule of law, a state of emergency should always occur 
within a de jure framework and, as happens in Portuguese constitutional law, respect tight constitutional 
requirements.  
What we have been witnessing in Portugal—unlike in our neighbours in Spain (Nogueira López & Doménech 
Pascual, 2020)—is a dutiful and well-intentioned parliamentary approval of most of the measures our Gov-
ernment deems to be appropriate. However, Portugal still struggles to implement policies based on evidence, 
and this lack of sufficient scientific expertise raises pertinent questions of political accountability. 
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4.4 Debate on COVID-19 jurisprudence 
The main deficiency in Portuguese constitutional justice is the absence of a constitutional complaint mech-
anism, similar to the Spanish “recurso de amparo constitucional” or the German “Verfassungsbeschwerde”. 
The Portuguese constitutional review model is hybrid, as it shares characteristics with the monist/Kelse-
nian model and traits of the diffused model of judicial review. In comparison with the Italian, German and 
Spanish systems of judicial review, the Portuguese system has some unique traits though. In addition to 
the Constitutional Court, it confers judicial review powers on ordinary courts as well. Accordingly, if an 
ordinary judge finds that the regulation applicable to a case is unconstitutional, the judge does not suspend 
the process and questions the Constitutional Court. Portuguese ordinary justices can dismiss the applica-
ble regulation in that specific judicial process, since they are under a duty to not apply unconstitutional 
legislation (Article 204).  
Yet, under the current adverse conditions, courts play a significant role in scrutinizing COVID-19 legislation. 
In Portugal, COVID-19 jurisprudence is still scarce. Still, a recent development is worth mentioning.After the 
constitutional state of emergency, a Portuguese citizen landed in the Azores archipelago and was compulsory 
confined (a measure implemented by the regional government of the Azores) for a period of fourteen days, and 
at his own expenses. The citizen then filed a writ of habeas corpus against arbitrary detention. Remarkably, 
the Court of Ponta Delgada decided that the decision to compulsorily confine violated freedom of movement 
and was organically unconstitutional, as the confinement took place after the end of the state of emergency. 
The court held that such restrictions on fundamental rights could only be legislated by Parliament or the Gov-
ernment (with prior authorization from Parliament).36 Additionally, the court ruled that imposing confinement 
on a citizen that was not COVID-19 positive disrespected the principle of proportionality.  
Although this decision had no direct effect for parties who were not in court (inter partes effect only), the 
President of the Government of the Azores immediately announced new measures for containing the spread 
of COVID-19. As a result, compulsory confinement was replaced by voluntary confinement. As this case was 
brought to the Portuguese Constitutional Court, on its first COVID-19 decision, it ruled unanimously that 
regional regulations which imposed mandatory confinement were organically unconstitutional.37
In times of emergency, whether constitutional or administrative, it is a cliché to claim that parliaments should 
be acutely vigilant. Notwithstanding their significance, one cannot downplay the relevance of the courts in 
scrutinizing violations of fundamental rights. The main dangers that could arise from muscular executives 
and diminished parliaments are well documented in academia. First, the Government might be tempted to 
extend its emergency powers beyond the emergency itself. Second, and quite ironically, if de jure constitu-
tional emergency is designed in an extremely strict and foreseeable way, a de facto postponement would be 
unpredictable and beyond the boundaries of the constitutional framework (Botelho, 2020d).
How can the protection of fundamental rights be combined with the strict requirements of controlling the 
COVID-19 pandemic? I believe the answer will lie in the delicate balance of ensuring public health without 
falling into the extreme of a “fascistoid-hysterical hygienic state” (faschistoid-hysterischen Hygienestaat) 
(Heinig, 2020). Above all, we should not give in to the naivety of envisaging constitutional/administrative 
exception as merely transitory and magically vanishing with the resumption of constitutional normality 
(Botelho, 2020d).
36. See Articles 18, 27/3, 44, and 165/1, b), of the Portuguese Constitution. 
37. Ruling of the Portuguese Constitutional Court no. 424/2020, of July 31st. 
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5 Portuguese legislation, jurisprudence and bibliography concerning COVID-19
5.1 Legislation38
a) Before the constitutional state of emergency
Parliamentary legislation:
- Civil Protection Framework Law, Law no. 27/2006, of July 3rd, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 126
- Health Framework Law, Law no. 48/90, of August 24th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 195
- Law on Public Vigilance of Health Risks, Law no. 81/2009, of August 21st, Diário da República, 1st Series, 
no. 162
Governmental legislative and normative acts:
- Decree-Law 10-A/2020, of March 13th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 52 (temporary and exceptional 
measures addressing the COVID-19 pandemic) 
- Administrative Rule no. 71/2020, of March 15th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 52-A (access restrictions 
in shopping malls, restaurants, and bars)
- Resolution no. 10-B/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of March 16th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 
53 (restoring border control)
- Resolution no. 10-C/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of March 17th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 
54 (civil requisition of port workers)
b) During the constitutional state of emergency
Parliamentary legislation
- Law no. 44/1986, of September 30th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 225 (regime of the state of siege 
and of the state of emergency)
Governmental legislative and normative acts:
- Decree-Law no. 2-A/2020, of March 20th, Diário da República, 1st series, no. 57 (regulating the declaration 
of a constitutional emergency)
- Decree-Law no. 2-B/2020, of April 2nd, Diário da República, 1st series, no. 66 (regulating the first proroga-
tion of the constitutional emergency)
- Decree-Law no. 2-C/2020, of April 17th, Diário da República, 1st series, no. 76 (regulating the second and 
last prorogation of the constitutional emergency)
c) After the constitutional state of emergency
Parliamentary legislation
- Law no. 31/2020, of August 11th, Diário da República, 1st series, no. 155 (amending Law-Decree no 20/2020, 
of May 1st)
38. The legislation is available at the institutional website: https://dre.pt/web/en/home/-/contents/list?q=covid 
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- Law no. 32/2020, of August 12th, Diário da República, 1st series, no. 156 (extraordinary tuition debt settle-
ments)
- Law no. 34/2020, of August 13th, Diário da República, 1st series, no. 157 (approving support for street 
marketers)
- Law no. 35/2020, of August 13th, Diário da República, 1st series, no. 157 (suspending municipal debt limits)
- Law no. 38/2020, of August 18th, Diário da República, 1st series, no. 160 (exceptional and temporary meas-
ures to safeguard public faculty members and students’ rights)
Governmental legislative and normative acts:
- Resolution no. 33-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of April 30th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 85 
(declaring the administrative exception of calamity)
- Resolution no. 38-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of May 17th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 95-B 
(extending the administrative exception of calamity)
- Resolution no. 40-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of May 29th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 105 
(second extension of the administrative exception of calamity)
- Resolution no. 53-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of July 14th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 135 
(declaring the administrative exceptions of calamity, contingency, and alert)
- Decree-Law no. 37-A/2020, of July 15th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 136 (amending the punitive 
regime applicable to non-compliance with the administrative status of exception)
- Resolution no. 53-C/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of July 17th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 138 
(granting a rescue loan to the Portuguese national airline TAP)
- Decree-Law no. 46-A/2020, of July 30th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 147 (support for companies in 
distress with severe revenue downfall)
- Resolution no. 55-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of July 31st, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 148 
(declaring a situation of contingency and alert)
- Resolution no. 63-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of August 14th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 
148 (extending the situation of contingency and alert)
- Decree-Law no. 52/2020, of August 11th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 155 (approving the ‘StayAway 
COVID’ application for mobile phones)
- Resolution no. 64-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of August 20th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 
162 (authorizing the investment of 20 million euros in contracts to acquire vaccines against COVID-19 under 
the centralized European procedure) 
- Resolution no. 68-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of August 28th, Diário da República, 1st Series, no. 
168 (extending the situation of contingency and alert)
- Resolution no. 70-A/2020 of the Council of Ministers, of September 11th, Diário da República, 1st Series, 
no. 178  (declaring a situation of contingency in the Portuguese continental territory)
5.2 Jurisprudence
- Ruling of the Portuguese Constitutional Court no. 424/2020, of July 31st. 
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